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To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first to empirically analyse the trading 
behaviour in the first phase of the European Union’s Emissions Trading System. We use a 
unique dataset that allows investigating the importance of permit trading transaction costs, 
such as information costs and search costs. This paper shows that transaction costs played 
an important role in the initial years of the programme. These costs were significant in 
explaining why some ETS firms did not participate in the European emissions trading 
market and chose to trade allowances indirectly via third parties rather than directly. This 
study also supports the concerns that transaction costs might be excessive for smaller 
participants. 
 





1 This working paper replaces the earlier version of this study. The main difference from the earlier study is that 
the current paper uses the bigger dataset and employs the different empirical strategy. The main results remain 
the same throughout both papers.  
* The corresponding author. E-mail: jurate.jaraite at econ.umu.se.   2
 
1. Introduction 
Emission trading gains momentum in the European Union (EU). The EU’s Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS) has been working since 2005 and will do so at least until 2020. In principle, 
the EU ETS, as with any other emissions-trading programme, is cost-effective. Cost-
effectiveness is obtained by allowing full transferability of emissions permits. Whether or not 
this cost-effective outcome is achieved in practice depends on how efficiently markets 
operate. One source of friction in these markets is trading transaction costs.  
In this paper, we investigate for the presence of trading transaction costs in the first phase 
(2005-2007) of the EU ETS. In particular, we seek to address the following questions in an 
empirical framework: What firms decide to trade, and how do they differ from non-traders? 
Further, how do transaction costs affect decisions of ETS firms? Are transaction costs 
significant and do they decrease over time due to learning-by-doing processes? There has not 
been much attempt to analyse these issues in the biggest and the most complex European 
emission trading system from an empirical perspective.  
The most important theoretical result is of Stavins (1995) who studies the potential impacts of 
trading transaction costs on pollution trading. Within his theoretical framework, he shows 
that, in the presence of these costs, the efficient equilibrium of the trading systems might be 
undermined due to a decrease in the volume of emissions traded.  
Although the empirical literature on transaction costs is rather rich, Krutilla and Krause 
(2010) in their recent survey still believe that “empirical assessments of transaction costs in 
the environmental literature are relatively patchy and incomplete” (p. 336). The existing 
empirical research has mainly focused on measuring trading transaction costs of the 
pioneering US permit trading programmes. For example, the lead permit trading programme, 
aimed at reducing the amount of lead added to gasoline, experienced high trading levels. 
However, Kerr and Mare (1998) found that transaction costs dissipated 10-20% of potential 
trading surpluses. A study of the RECLAIM found that without transaction costs the 
probability of trading would have been 32% and 12% higher in 1995 and 1996, respectively 
(Gangadharan 2000). This suggests that transaction costs are more significant in the early 
stages of the programme, and then decrease as the market matures, and participants learn how 
to trade (Cason and Gangadharan 2003). The well-known Acid Rain Program for trading SO2 
emission can be regarded as efficient. Brokerage fees – a proxy for trading transaction costs – 
were estimated to be minimum (Joskow et al. 1998). 
The research on trading transaction costs in the EU ETS is rather limited. The first trading 
phase (2005-2007) revealed that a number of tradable permits expired worthless at the end of 
the first trading period (Ellerman and Trotingnon 2009). It has been discussed that it is very 
likely that a large part of these permits never entered the market, i.e. some ETS participants 
used permits only for compliance, but not for revenue purposes. To some extent this is 
confirmed by Jaraitė et al. (2010) who analyse for the presence of trading transactions costs, 
among other types of transaction costs, in Ireland. They find that some Irish firms did not sell   3
surplus permits in the market and conclude that this non-trading behaviour cannot be 
explained by trading transaction costs but rather by an inclination among smaller firms in 
particular to use permits for compliance only, caution at the beginning of the period and the 
low permit prices at the end of the trading period seem to be the primary reasons for non-
participation in trading.  
This study contributes to the empirical research on transaction costs in the most complex and 
ambitious emissions tradable programme ever developed. We use a unique dataset to 
investigate the trading behaviour of all ETS firms throughout the first phase of the EU ETS. 
Additionally, this dataset allows identifying several firm-level transaction costs variables and 
to check for their significance in firms’ decisions to trade. We find that transaction costs can 
explain why a number of ETS firms did not participate in the European emission trading 
market and chose to trade allowances indirectly rather than directly. This study also supports 
the concerns that transaction costs might be excessive for smaller participants.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a brief description of the 
EU ETS and the introduction to the dataset that provides the basis for this analysis. Section 3 
provides an empirical framework to analyse the trading behaviour and significance of 
transaction costs in the EU ETS market. The results and their implications are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 highlights the contributions of this paper and concludes.  
 
2. Background on the EU ETS and CITL data 
2.1 The brief description of the EU ETS 
The EU ETS operates over pre-defined time periods, with the first period (2005-2007) being 
the subject of this study. The second phase coincides with the commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012), and this will be pursued by a third period (2013-2020).  
The inclusion criteria for the first phase of the EU ETS are set in Annex I of the Emissions 
Trading Directive (European Parliament  and Council 2003). This period covered CO2 
emissions from so called combustion installations with a rated thermal input in excess of 20 
megawatts (mainly electricity and heat generators), oil refineries, the production and 
processing of ferrous metals, the manufacture of cement, the manufacture of lime, ceramics, 
glass, and pulp and paper. This coverage accounted for about a half of CO2 emissions and 
40% of total greenhouse gas emissions. About 11 500 installations in all EU27 member states 
were covered. 
In the EU ETS, each installation should comply with the Emissions Trading Directive on 
annual basis. Compliance consists of surrendering tradable rights to emit, called European 
Union Allowances (EUAs). Each EUA is equal to one tonne of CO2 emitted. Each installation 
is required to hold a number of EUAs corresponding to its actual verified emissions. If it is 
assumed that installations surrender the allowances allocated to them first before making any 
exchanges in the market, the differences between each installation’s actual emissions and its 
allocation indicate the extent of trading. Each net long installation (allocation is greater than   4
actual emissions) is a potential seller; and each net short installation (allocation is lower than 
actual emissions) is a potential buyer.
2  
However, annual differences between allowances and actual emissions do not necessarily 
imply a transfer involving another installation or third party. ETS installations can bank EUAs 
not used in one year for use in a later year and they can borrow from the allocation for the 
next year to cover deficits in any given year. Banking and borrowing is allowed within but not 
between the trading phases. 
2.2 The presentation of the CITL data 
Each EU member state hosts a national registry consisting of accounts for all ETS 
installations. The registries keep information on the initial allocation of allowances, the 
annual verified actual emissions, the surrendered allowances, and all transfers in and out of 
the accounts. A copy of the national registry records is maintained in the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL). The CITL is the central registry for the EU ETS. The 
CITL data on compliance and transfers are publicly available, but the data on transfers are 
published with a time lag of five years. This means that all transfers of EUAs that were made, 
for example, in 2007 became displayed from 15 January onwards of year 2012.  
In this paper, the focus is only on transactions performed by ETS installations, i.e. the trading 
behaviour of third parties is not considered. More explicitly, we will analyse the trading 
behaviour of installations that sold some allowances to other installations or third parties, and 
on installations that bought some allowances from other installations or third parties. 
Technically, a transfer at no price is also possible, but prices at which allowances were 
transferred are not publicly available. In the CITL data, installations are named as Operator 
holding accounts and third parties – as Person holding accounts. An exchange of allowances 
between two Operator holding accounts can be named as a direct trade, whereas a transfer 
between an Operator holding account and a Person holding account can be titled as an indirect 
trade.
3 
For the purpose of this analysis, the installation level data on compliance and transfers were 
aggregated to the firm level. At the time this study was performed, the transfers were 
available for the period 2005-2007. The last transfer was made in the end of December 2007. 
As the compliance period for the year 2007 finished in April 2008, it means that our dataset 
does not cover all transfers performed in the phase of the EU ETS. However, knowing that 
EUA price approached zero in the end of 2007, we expect that most transactions were 




2 According Ellerman and Trotingnon (2009), there were only 27 instances over the three-year period with 
emissions exactly equal to the annual allocation. 
3 From the transaction cost perspective, indirect trading is perceived as entailing trading transaction costs. 
Because of this, brokerage fees are treated as a best proxy of trading transaction costs as one only engages in 
indirect (direct) trading if his or her transaction costs of direct trading are higher (lower) than brokerage fee.   5
3. The empirical strategy 
The empirical strategy is built upon the main objectives of this study. We seek to answer the 
following questions: First, why ETS firms decide to trade allowances? Second, why ETS 
firms choose to exchange allowances indirectly rather than directly? Third, what factors 
explain the extent of trading? More specifically, our interest lies in whether transaction costs 
affect the trading behaviour of ETS firms.  
3.1 Model choice 
In our framework, ETS firms make two decisions with respect to trading in an effort to 
maximise their profitability: (1) whether to participate in allowance trading (a participation 
decision), and (2) how many allowances to trade given their participation (a quantity 
decision). Thus, the zero values in our data represent firms’ optimal decisions rather than 
some sort of missing values. Because of this, corner solution models are more appropriate 
than selection models for our analysis.
4 
The Tobit model (Tobin 1958) might be used to deal with the above corner solution problem. 
However, the this model can be very restrictive for both economic and statistical reasons since 
it assumes that the same set of variables determines both the probability of participation in 
trade and the level of trade, and that the factors affect both decisions in a similar way. A 
double-hurdle (DH) model, originally proposed by Cragg (1971), is a more flexible modelling 
framework in addressing corner solution problems. It assumes that firms make two decisions 
concerning allowance trading. Each decision might be determined by different factors and the 
effects of each factor can be different for each decision. The DH model fits well the research 
questions of this study since it allows testing whether transaction costs affect the participation 
and quantity decisions in different ways.  
This study follows the modified Cragg’s (1971) model. The first stage (Hurdle 1) of the 
analysis constructs a model of the probability of trading focusing on the role of transaction 
costs. Then we estimate a model of the probability of trading indirectly. For both cases the 
underlying trading decisions are modelled as: 
    
∗                      ,       (1)
     
where      
∗		is a latent variable that underlines an observed indicator variable that captures 
whether or not a firm trades according to the following rule:  
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    (2)
    
and  
                                                            
4 The Heckman selection approach is designed for cases when there are some sort of missing values, which 
might be reported as zeros in a dataset (Wooldridge 2010).     6
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where     are firm-specific time invariant variables;     are firm-specific time variant 
variables;    are firm-specific time invariant unobservables such as firm culture, firm social 
responsibility, management background etc. The first stage uses the probit regressions to 
analyse factors affecting the participation in trading and indirect trading.  
As said above, one of the challenges when analysing the trading behaviour is that many firms 
choose not to trade, so the data take on the properties of non-linear corner solution variables. 
The covariates of the non-linear panel model must be independent of unobserved 
heterogeneity    . In the linear model, unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for by 
including fixed firm-specific effects. In non-linear models, however, any attempt to estimate 
fixed unobserved heterogeneity effects will lead to the incidental parameters problem, 
resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates. However, using random effects requires the 
assumption that the random effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables in the 
model. This is a restrictive assumption, particularly in the context of the model we are 
attempting to estimate, where firm specific variables, such as choice of capital inputs and firm 
characteristics, are likely to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity. 
The assumption of independence between covariates and unobserved heterogeneity can be 
relaxed using a corrected random effects (CRE) framework which follows Mundlak (1978) 
and Chamberlain (1984). To control for potential correlations between the random effects and 
the other exogenous variables, the CRE option is to model the unobserved heterogeneity (  ) 
as a function of the means of the time varying explanatory variables: 
 
             ,            (4) 
 
where      is an average of     over time for each firm. We assume that time invariant    is 
distributed as   0,  
   and is uncorrelated with     and other time invariant exogenous 
variables. 
 
The model can now be written as: 
 
           1 |  ,    ,    ,                                   .   (5) 
 
In the second stage (Hurdle 2), we investigate to what extent the transaction costs variables 
affect the extent of trading. For this purpose, we use a model that accounts for time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity: 
 
                             ,       (6)   7
where a         variable is the amount of traded allowances (in logs) by individual firms;     
is an error term.  
This paper maintains Cragg’s (1971) original assumptions that conditional on the explanatory 
variables, the errors between Hurdle 1 and Hurdle 2 are independent and normally distributed 
and that the covariance between the two errors equals zero.  
Before exploiting the panel nature of the dataset, we also estimate the cross-sectional hurdle 
models for each available year to explore the learning-by-doing effects of allowance trading.  
3.2 The choice of factors affecting trade 
The above models include a number of variables as the determinants of the trading decisions. 
These variables are: firm revenue, firm fixed assets, firm net allocation position, firm size in 
terms of allocation, the sectoral and regional dummies, and some transaction costs variables. 
Firm output is an indicator of firm size in terms of its main activity. We use firm-level 
revenue to proxy firm output.
5 Additionally, this variable might indicate whether a firm is a 
part of growing or declining industry. Notice, that revenue takes into account only income 
received from the main activity, i.e. income associated with trading allowances is not 
reflected in this variable and therefore this does not cause an endogeneity problem.  
The technology of a firm is an important factor influencing the level of pollution. Also, 
technology depicts pollution abatement potential and hence a possibility to free up 
allowances. Fixed capital
6 is used in this paper to proxy technology. Fixed capital, conditional 
on firm size (capital intensity), might indicate technological differences across firms. 
Additionally, we use several sectoral dummies, which will give an idea of products being 
manufactured by each ETS firm. However, these dummies are very aggregate and probably 
will not give much firm specific information.  
Firm net allocation positions are used to capture the potential extent of trading. As said above, 
we expect that firms with the positive net allocation positions are the potential sellers of 
allowances, whereas firms with the negative net allocation position are the potential buyers of 
allowances.  
Following Jaraitė et al. (2010), we group ETS firms according to the level of firms’ allocated 
permits into three categories: large (with an allocation share larger than 2% of the particular 
country’s total allocation, medium (0.1% - 2%) and small (up to 0.1%). We expect small ETS 
firms to be less experienced in trading when compared to large ETS firms who trade on daily 
basis in different markets (e.g. electricity generators).  
                                                            
5 Firm-level revenue as well as fixed capital are obtained from the Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk). This database 
includes firm-level accounting and other data in standardised financial format. The general source for the 
Amadeus is national official public bodies in European countries. The Amadeus database is a very useful 
information source for cross-country comparisons as it provides harmonised accounts for large fraction of 
European firms. A lot of effort has been used to identify ETS firms in this dataset. Detailed information of how 
this identification was performed can be received from the authors upon request.  
6 See Footnote 5.    8
We also include few regional dummies to understand whether there is any geographical 
variation in the decision to trade allowances. We were unable to use country-level dummies 
due to the issue of multicollinearity.  
As discussed above, a number of firms did not sell their surplus allowances during the first 
phase of the EU ETS. One of the reasons for this could be high transaction costs that might 
prevent firms entering the market. When transaction costs are non-zero, some firms might opt 
out of the market meaning that we should take into account transaction costs variables when 
modelling the trading decisions. Based on the available data, we construct two variables – 
search costs and information costs – that identify transaction costs in the EU ETS market.  
According to Gangadharan (2000), search costs can potentially be rather high for 
heterogeneous firms as they do not often interact in the same input or output markets. Also, 
some ETS firms consist of more than one ETS installation meaning that these firms have a 
possibility to trade/transfer allowances within a firm. This reduces their search costs. Also, we 
might expect these firms to trade directly without the help of a broker. Using information 
from the CITL and national allocation plans we are able to count the number of ETS 
installations within each ETS firm.  
The number of transactions that is performed by a firm can capture information costs to some 
degree. This gives the number of times a firm enters the market. Every time a firm trades 
directly or indirectly it gains more experience in the market, obtains more information. We 
expect that as the number of transaction increases, information costs go down. We construct a 
dummy variable, which is equal to one if a firm traded twice or more in the years 2005 and 
2006.  
 
4. The results 
4.1 The descriptive statistics  
Table 1 summarises the dataset according to the year, the type of trade, and the allocation 
position. The dataset consists of 18 086 observations for the period 2005-2007.
7 About a 
quarter of ETS firms sold some allowances, and about one sixth of ETS firms bought some 
allowances. More than half of these trading firms sold/bought allowances indirectly to/from 
the third parties. The year 2005 was the least active in terms of trading activity. This might be 
explained by the fact that many member states were late to set up their national registries. The 
year 2006 was the most active in terms of selling activity, whereas the year 2007 – in terms of 
buying activity. As expected, most firms who sold some allowances had the positive net 
allocation. About a half of firms who bought some allowances were “long” too. We might 
expect that these firms primarily bought allowances not for compliance, but for financial 
speculation purposes. The data reveals that more than thousand ETS firms bought and sold 
some allowances within the same year.  
                                                            
7 Some adjustments were made to the CITL data. As a result of that, several unrepresentative observations 
dropped out. The details can be obtained from the authors upon request.   9














2005  5  951  767 703 617 234  129  112 
2006  6 072  2 177  1 955  1 558  1 078  558  498 
2007  6 063  1 607  1 393  978  1 384  672  743 
Total   18 086  4 551  4 051  3 153  2 696  1 359  1 353 
Sources: CITL and authors’ calculations. 
 
From Table 2 it is evident that Germany, France, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom were 
the top sellers. However, in Estonia, Finland and the Netherlands more than half ETS firms 
sold their allowances in the market. In terms of buying activity, the most active were 
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Spain. To some extent the geographical 
distribution of trading activities reflect the net allocation positions for each country. For 
example, Germany, France and Poland had the positive net allocation positions and were 
among the top sellers of allowances; while Italy, the UK and Spain had the negative net 
allocation positions and were among the top buyers of allowances.  
Table 2 The geographical distribution of trading activity 
  
No. of firms 
who sold  
some EUAs 
Mean of no. 
EUAs sold 
(in thousands) 
No. of firms 
who bought  
some EUAs 






Austria  28 58.2 22 28.2  343 
Belgium  141  287.4 66 297.8  590 
Czech  Republic  280  176.8 83 114.1  765 
Denmark  257 132.5 143 180.6 731 
Estonia  45 410.5 14 330.0 86 
Finland 214  110.8  138  59.8  421 
France 672  125.8  233  87.3  1717 
Germany  695 189.5 567 147.1  3030 
Greece  13  213.6 8 129.8  291 
Hungary 120  103.8  50  87.3  444 
Ireland  29 20.1 36 58.5  213 
Italy  189 381.2 309 277.8  1658 
Latvia  59 67.8 19 58.8  171 
Lithuania  67 241.3 18 165.5  201 
Netherlands  192  437.2 78 478.0  387 
Poland 379  195.4  110  62.9  1672 
Portugal  118  129.3 52 126.3  603 
Slovakia 133  121.3  48  80.1  393 
Slovenia  12 21.3 32 20.1  276 
Spain  323 158.2 217 353.3  2115 
Sweden  275 58.9 180 57.0 767 
United  Kingdom  310 557.6 273 763.8  1212 
Total  4551 202.6 2696 230.1  18086 
 Sources: CITL and authors’ calculations. 
The average size of firm-level selling/buying transactions and its geographical distribution is 
presented in Table 2. It is important to remind that these transfers might also include transfers 
at no price. On average, an ETS firm sold 202.6 thousand EUAs and bought 230.1 thousand   10
EUAs. ETS firms in the UK, the Netherlands and Estonia sold on average the largest amount 
of permits, whereas ETS firms in the UK, the Netherlands and Spain bought on average the 
largest amount of permits.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. Separately, the 
summary statistics are reported for firms that sold and bought some allowances. It is evident 
that firms that traded some allowances were bigger in terms of capital and revenues than an 
average ETS firm. Firms that bought some allowances had larger capital and revenue 
compared to firms that sold some EUAs. The average net allocation position, i.e. the 
difference between the allocated allowances and verified emissions, was positive for sellers 
and negative for buyers. Also, firms who traded some EUAs consisted of more installations 
than the average firm. It is also evident that buyers had, on average, more installations than 
sellers. The summary statistics for sectoral dummies reveal that firms in the power generating 
sector were the most active in allowance trading.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 The discussion of the main estimation results
8  
The results of the cross-sectional and panel first stage hurdle models are presented in Table 
4.
9 Columns 1-4 summarise the determinants of the decision to sell allowances; Columns 5-8 
summarise the determinants of the choice to buy allowances. It is evident that the transaction 
costs variables – search costs and information costs – were significant in explaining the 
trading decisions in the first phase of the EU ETS. ETS firms with larger number of ETS 
installations were more likely to participate in trading. This might indicate that for a firm with 
multiple installations it was easier to find a trading partner, i.e. it could sell/buy its allowances 
within a firm meaning that its search costs were lower than for a ETS firm with a single 
installation. Also, ETS firms with multiple installations might have a separate unit to deal 
with EU ETS issues and a coordinated compliance strategy. Another important result related 
to transaction costs is that information costs were significant in the years 2006 and 2007. If 
the number of trades recorded in 2005 and 2006 was equal or greater than two, then the 
probability that an average ETS firm trades in 2006 and 2007 is higher. This suggests that 
firms that entered the market several times have more information on the procedures to be 
followed and hence incur lower information costs. In the panel probit models (see columns 4 
and 8), this result is captured by the coefficients for the Mundlak terms of the information 
costs variables.
10 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                            
8 Due to a large number of missing observations for firm revenue and fixed capital, these variables were 
excluded from the models reported in this paper. The results of the models that include these variables are 
available from the authors upon request. These variables are insignificant in most models and do not alter the 
main findings of this paper.  
9 The marginal effects for all non-linear models were estimated too. They are in line with the estimates of the 
baseline specifications and, hence, are not reported here, but available from the authors upon request.  
10 The Mundlak terms can be thought of as representing the permanent (long-run) changes in the relevant 
variables, i.e. the level effects while the time-varying variables capture the transient changes or shock effects 
(short-run).    11
As expected, ETS firms with larger net allocation positions were more likely to sell 
allowances and less likely to buy them. This result is significant in the cross-sectional models 
for the years 2006 and 2007 and in the panel probit model for sellers. We also find that firm 
size matters in making trading decisions: medium and large ETS firms in terms of allocation 
were more likely to trade allowances. In other words, small ETS firms were less prone to 
participate in allowance trading. This result supports the concerns raised by the European 
Commission (e.g. see CEC (2008)) that trading transaction costs might be excessive for 
smaller participants. The coefficients of the sectoral dummy variables indicate that ETS firms 
in the power generating sector were more likely to participate in allowance trading than other 
ETS firms. This might be explained by the size of energy generating firms as well as their 
trading experience in other input and output markets. The coefficients for the regional 
dummies reveal that most countries were less likely to buy allowances and more prone to sell 
them when compared to Germany. The exceptions are Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, where ETS firms were less probable to sell allowances. These results to 
some extent reflect the country-level net allocation positions.  
The second aim of this study is to understand why ETS firms choose to trade allowances 
indirectly rather than directly.
11 As mentioned above, from the transaction costs perspective, 
indirect trading is perceived as entailing trading transaction costs. This suggests that firms 
with high transaction costs are more likely to trade allowances indirectly. The results of the 
cross-sectional and panel first stage hurdle models for the indirect trading choice are 
presented in Table 5. Columns 1-4 summarise the determinants of the decision to sell 
allowances indirectly; Columns 5-8 summarise the determinants of the choice to buy 
allowances indirectly.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Transactions costs appear to be significant in explaining the choice to trade allowances 
indirectly. As expected, ETS firms with multiple installations were less likely to trade 
indirectly. This confirms our arguments presented above that search costs for ETS firms with 
multiple installations are lower. These firms have a possibility to trade within firm 
boundaries; also, they are bigger and have a sufficient in-house capacity to trade directly with 
other ETS firms. Another finding is that firms who sold their allowances in the previous 
periods are more likely to sell EUAs indirectly. To some extent this might indicate that selling 
allowances through third parties was not expensive, i.e. fixed transaction fees were low 
enough not to discourage experienced firms to sell their allowances indirectly. That brokerage 
fees for trading allowances were low and declining during the first trading phase is confirmed 
by Convery and Redmond (2007). However, the effect of information costs is opposite for 
buyers. In 2006, experienced buyers were less likely to trade indirectly. This effect is also 
confirmed by the Mundlak term of the information costs variable. This finding is along our 
expectations that firms experienced in trading would be less prone to trade indirectly. The 
difference between sellers and buyers might indicate that brokers were more active on the 
supply side of the market. Anecdotal evidence collected at the interviews of Irish ETS firms 
                                                            
11 See Subsection 2.2 for the definitions of direct and indirect trading.    12
shows that brokers were very active in convincing over-allocated ETS firms to sell surplus 
allowances.
12 
The remaining estimates show that the net allocation position had no effect on the decision to 
trade allowances indirectly. Medium and large ETS firms in terms of allocation were less 
prone to trade indirectly. This result is applicable only for sellers. The coefficients of the 
sectoral dummy variables indicate that ETS firms in the power generating sector were more 
likely to trade indirectly than firms in the other sectors. We suggest that this result does not 
signify that power generator had higher transaction costs, but available in-house capacity to 
trade indirectly. The coefficients for the regional dummies are significant only for some 
regions. The noticeable result is that ETS firms operating in the member states that accessed 
the EU in 2004 were more likely to sell their allowances indirectly. To some extent this might 
signify that these firms did not have a sufficient capacity and experience to trade directly. 
The last aim of this study is to investigate whether trading transaction costs are important in 
explaining the extent of trading. According to Stavins (1995), fixed trading transaction costs 
can affect whether or not a particular transaction takes place but not its magnitude. Variable 
trading transaction costs or so-called positive marginal transaction costs reduce the amount 
exchanged in each trade and may diminish the number of trades. In return, this may affect the 
overall cost-effectiveness of the permit trading programme. 
Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional and panel (random effects) second stage 
hurdle models. Columns 1-4 summarise the results for sellers, and Columns 5-8 – for buyers. 
Both transaction costs variables have a significant effect on the amount of permits traded. 
This might indicate that transaction costs in the EU ETS are not only fixed in nature, but also 
are affected by the amount of allowances traded. The number of installations within a firm 
had a positive effect on the amount of allowances sold. As discussed above, this might signify 
that firms with multiple installations are more active in selling allowances due to larger in-
house trading capacity. This is also confirmed by the coefficients for size dummies. Medium 
and large ETS firms traded more permits than small ETS firms. Another important result 
related to transaction costs is that past trading experience had a significant effect in explaining 
the extent of trading. The remaining estimates are similar to the ones in the first stage hurdle 
models and, hence, are not discussed here.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
As a final step of this study, we run the above models with two additional economic variables 
– revenue from the main activity and fixed capital – to control for firm size and technology. 
Revenue might be also an indicator of whether a firm is a part of an expanding or declining 
industry. These variables turned out to be insignificant and are therefore not reported. The full 




12 These interviews were performed during the write-up of Jaraitė et al.’s (2010) study.    13
5. The conclusions 
Several authors (Coase 1960; Tietenberg 2006) have commented on the importance of a 
comprehensive approach to assessing transaction costs. The assessment of trading transaction 
costs is especially important in the early stages of any pollution trading programme. To the 
best of our knowledge, our study is the first to empirically analyse permit trading transaction 
costs for all firms covered under the first phase the EU’s Emissions Trading System.  
This study exploits the unique dataset that allows investigating the trading behaviour of ETS 
firms as well as significance of trading transaction costs, such as information costs and search 
costs. In particular, we aimed to address the following questions in an empirical framework: 
What firms decide to trade, and how do they differ from non-traders? Further, how do 
transaction costs affect decisions of ETS firms? Are transaction costs significant and do they 
decrease over time due to learning-by-doing processes? Our analysis shows that transaction 
costs played an important role in the initial years of the EU ETS. These costs were significant 
in explaining why some ETS firms did not participate in the European emissions trading 
market and chose to trade allowances indirectly via third parties. This study also supports the 
concerns raised by the European Commission (e.g. see CEC, 2008) that transaction costs 
might be excessive for smaller participants.  
The further research on the trading behaviour in the EU ETS might focus on EUA price 
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Table 3 The descriptive statistics 
All firms  Firms that sold EUAs  Firms that bought EUAs 
Variable  Measurement units  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Firms that sold some allowances  A dummy variable  18086  0.252  0.434  4551 1.000  0.000  2696 0.510  0.500 
Firms that bought some allowances  A dummy variable  18086  0.149  0.356  4551 0.302  0.459  2696 1.000  0.000 
No. of permits sold  Thousands EUAs 18086 51.0  507.9  4551 202.6  997.4  2696 207.9  1090.1 
No. of permits bought  Thousands EUAs 18086 34.3  517.4  4551 111.9  949.9  2696 230.1  1323.3 
Difference btw. allocation and emissions Thousands  EUAs  18086  11.0 383.5  4551  35.1  588.5  2696  -50.1  824.8 
Number of installation within a firm  No. of installations 18086  1.714  2.709  4551  2.623 4.638  2696  3.171 5.644 
If traded more than twice in 2006-2007  A dummy variable  11993  0.051  0.221  3778 0.098  0.298  2458 0.174  0.379 
Small firms in terms of allocation  A dummy variable  18086  0.771  0.420  4551  0.574  0.495  2696  0.618  0.486 
Medium firms in terms of allocation  A dummy variable  18086  0.195  0.396  4551  0.349  0.477  2696  0.295  0.456 
Largest firms in terms of allocation  A dummy variable  18086  0.034  0.181  4551 0.077  0.267  2696 0.087  0.282 
France and Belgium   A dummy variable  18086  0.128  0.334  4551 0.179  0.383  2696 0.111  0.314 
Germany  A dummy variable  18086  0.168  0.373  4551 0.153  0.360  2696 0.210  0.408 
Hungary and Austria  A dummy variable  18086  0.044  0.204  4551 0.033  0.177  2696 0.027  0.161 
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain  A dummy variable  18086  0.258  0.438  4551  0.141  0.348  2696  0.217  0.413 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  A dummy  variable  18086  0.025  0.157  4551 0.038  0.190  2696 0.019  0.136 
Netherlands  A dummy variable  18086  0.021  0.145  4551 0.042  0.201  2696 0.029  0.168 
CZ, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia  A dummy variable  18086  0.172  0.377  4551 0.177  0.381  2696 0.101  0.302 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden  A dummy variable  18086  0.106  0.308  4551 0.164  0.370  2696 0.171  0.377 
UK and Ireland  A dummy variable  18086  0.079  0.269  4551 0.074  0.263  2696 0.115  0.319 
Power generation  A dummy variable  18086  0.183  0.387  4551 0.283  0.451  2696 0.226  0.418 
Food, beverages and tobacco  A dummy variable  18086  0.067  0.251  4551 0.054  0.227  2696 0.062  0.240 
Textiles and leather   A dummy variable  18086  0.017  0.130  4551 0.010  0.101  2696 0.004  0.064 
Wood and paper  A dummy variable  18086  0.145  0.352  4551 0.143  0.350  2696 0.141  0.348 
Coke, cement and refined products  A dummy variable  18086  0.062  0.240  4551 0.078  0.268  2696 0.083  0.276 
Chemicals and pharmaceutical products  A dummy variable  18086  0.048  0.213  4551 0.053  0.225  2696 0.046  0.210 
Glass, ceramics and plastic  A dummy variable  18086  0.198  0.398  4551  0.122  0.327  2696  0.134  0.341 
Metals   A dummy variable  18086  0.016  0.125  4551 0.013  0.114  2696 0.013  0.113 
Computers and machinery  A dummy variable  18086  0.031  0.173  4551 0.020  0.139  2696 0.023  0.151 
Other sectors  A dummy variable  18086  0.234  0.423  4551 0.223  0.417  2696 0.267  0.443 
Revenue Millions  euro  12019  643.9  3843.8  3227 1058.4  4658.3  1887 1423.9  5622.1 
Fixed assets  Millions euro  12313  433.1 3393.7 3308  748.7  4880.0 1908  1114.0  6466.0 
Sources: AMADEUS, CITL and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 4 The determinants of the participation in the EU ETS market (Hurdle 1) 
   If firms sold some EUAs  If firms bought some EUAs 
Variables  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007  2005  2006 2007  2005-2007 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Net allocation  0.0001  0.0003***  0.0002***  -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001**  -0.0002***  -0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
No. of installation within a firm  0.0382***  0.0949***  0.1031***  0.0855***  0.0632***  0.1181***  0.0802***  0.0831*** 
(0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0102)  (0.0094) (0.0103)  (0.0104)  (0.0107) 
If sold twice and more (lag)  1.3097***  0.7290***  -1.5513*** 
(0.0956) (0.0461) (0.0836) 
If bought twice and more (lag)  0.9369*** 1.0754*** -1.6874*** 
(0.1378) (0.0677) (0.1224) 
Medium  firms    0.7846*** 0.4585*** 0.4791*** 0.3678***  0.5682***  0.3381*** 0.2106*** 0.2544*** 
(0.0599) (0.0496) (0.0510) (0.0489)  (0.0846) (0.0547)  (0.0528)  (0.0554) 
Largest  firms  0.9457*** 0.4026*** 0.9220*** 0.6099***  0.9018***  0.4991*** 0.4647*** 0.4000*** 
(0.1183) (0.1131) (0.1135) (0.1111)  (0.1432) (0.1125)  (0.1129)  (0.1209) 
France and Belgium   0.2891***  0.3493***  0.4717***  0.4780***  -0.4501***  -0.3263***  -0.2057***  -0.2982*** 
(0.0749) (0.0668) (0.0700) (0.0659)  (0.1155) (0.0757)  (0.0710)  (0.0746) 
Hungary and Austria  -1.8865***  0.0186  -0.2292**  -0.0058 -1.2820***  -0.5538***  -0.4691***  -0.5123*** 
(0.2832) (0.0951) (0.1071) (0.0949)  (0.2893) (0.1195)  (0.1093)  (0.1134) 
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain  -1.0830***  -0.0787 -0.1172* -0.0298  -1.1367*** -0.1249*  -0.1322**  -0.1117* 
(0.0980) (0.0587) (0.0635) (0.0574)  (0.1528) (0.0640)  (0.0583)  (0.0613) 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  -0.5415***  0.4364***  -0.1396 0.2612** -0.7295***  -0.4817***  -0.5938***  -0.7006*** 
(0.1456) (0.1219) (0.1274) (0.1154)  (0.2305) (0.1422)  (0.1453)  (0.1515) 
Netherlands  0.5596*** 0.6993*** 0.3475*** 0.4491***  -0.1304  0.0170  -0.4151***  -0.4252*** 
(0.1332) (0.1343) (0.1315) (0.1275)  (0.1811) (0.1357)  (0.1454)  (0.1477) 
CZ, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia  -0.7934***  0.2097***  0.2198*** 0.2815***  -0.9205***  -0.6440***  -0.2934***  -0.4614*** 
(0.0892) (0.0614) (0.0655) (0.0603)  (0.1399) (0.0762)  (0.0667)  (0.0710) 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden  0.3137***  0.3570***  0.1273*  0.2735***  -0.1549  0.0965  -0.0563  0.0240 
(0.0776) (0.0710) (0.0753) (0.0693)  (0.1050) (0.0733)  (0.0734)  (0.0756) 
UK  and  Ireland  -0.0886  0.2250***  -0.1275  0.0433 0.0200 0.0653  -0.0405  -0.0070 
(0.0961) (0.0802) (0.0883) (0.0792)  (0.1160) (0.0829)  (0.0829)  (0.0855) 
Food, beverages and tobacco  -0.5955***  -0.4360***  -0.3914*** -0.4144***  -0.0170  -0.0736  0.0105  -0.0274 
(0.1144) (0.0816) (0.0877) (0.0801)  (0.1622) (0.0916)  (0.0867)  (0.0898) 
Textiles and leather   -0.6447**  -0.2761**  -0.6438***  -0.3655*** -5.0252 -0.6254***  -0.5461***  -0.6525*** 
(0.2549) (0.1389) (0.1807) (0.1415)  (12,669.3702) (0.2224)  (0.2043)  (0.2030) 
Wood and paper  -0.1239  -0.2766***  -0.3468***  -0.3393*** 0.1954*  -0.1742**  0.1156* -0.0268 
(0.0785) (0.0631) (0.0680) (0.0627)  (0.1177) (0.0717)  (0.0684)  (0.0714)   17
Table 4 (cont’) 
   If firms sold some EUAs  If firms bought some EUAs 
Variables    2005 2006 2007  2005-2007  2005  2006 2007  2005-2007 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Coke, cement and refined products  -0.5583***  -0.4072***  -0.1400  -0.2403***  0.1145  -0.2468***  0.2021**  0.0275 
(0.1081) (0.0842) (0.0862) (0.0820)  (0.1394) (0.0934)  (0.0871)  (0.0918) 
Chemicals and pharmaceutics  -0.5092*** -0.2699***  -0.1344 -0.1535*  -0.0010  -0.0804 0.0237 -0.0183 
(0.1195) (0.0923) (0.0945) (0.0886)  (0.1737) (0.1034)  (0.0985)  (0.1031) 
Glass, ceramics and plastic  -0.6907***  -0.4366***  -0.2306***  -0.2791*** -0.4582*** -0.5220***  0.1416**  -0.0947 
(0.0932) (0.0600) (0.0637) (0.0585)  (0.1638) (0.0747)  (0.0645)  (0.0680) 
Metals   -0.9483***  -0.5260***  -0.2193  -0.3173** 0.3452  -0.0995  -0.0480  -0.0534 
(0.2583) (0.1479) (0.1575) (0.1425)  (0.2459) (0.1707)  (0.1650)  (0.1659) 
Computers and machinery  -0.5885***  -0.5430***  -0.3872*** -0.4255***  -0.1499  0.0317  -0.2977**  -0.1817 
(0.1647) (0.1116) (0.1213) (0.1093)  (0.2543) (0.1230)  (0.1314)  (0.1276) 
Other sectors  -0.3925***  -0.5760***  -0.1596*** -0.3018***  0.0786  -0.0328  -0.0078  -0.0113 
(0.0702) (0.0587) (0.0606) (0.0568)  (0.1021) (0.0638)  (0.0630)  (0.0647) 
Year 2006 dummy  0.2092*** -0.3969*** 
(0.0319) (0.0349) 
Net allocation (Mundlak term)  0.0004**  -0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Sold twice and more (lag, Mundlak term)  4.3220*** 
(0.1407) 
Bought twice and more  (lag, Mundlak term)  5.4963*** 
(0.2252) 
Constant  -0.9087*** -0.4851*** -1.0208*** -1.2212*** -1.7477*** -0.9269***  -0.9442***  -1.1008*** 
(0.0690) (0.0606) (0.0647) (0.0655)  (0.0986) (0.0652)  (0.0639)  (0.0713) 
Log  likelihood  -3167.0 -7301.0 -5900.8 -5373.6 -1312.3 -4645.5  -5575.4  -4743.3 
Wald  test  (Chi2)  532.4  1736.3 1301.2 1407.7  67.3  727.6  1051.1  939.4 
Wald  test  (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations  (total)  5951 5947 6046  11993  5951  5947 6046  11993 







Table 5 The determinants of the choice to trade allowances indirectly  
   If firms sold some EUAs indirectly  If firms bought some EUAs indirectly 
Variables  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Net allocation  0.0001  0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0000  0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
No. of installation within a firm  -0.0270***  -0.0928***  -0.1014*** -0.1909***  -0.0115  -0.0633*** -0.1042*** -0.2495*** 
(0.0093) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0211)  (0.0120) (0.0127)  (0.0139)  (0.0387) 
If sold twice and more (lag)  0.2146**  0.1835**  0.4615*** 
(0.0885) (0.0731) (0.1316) 
If bought twice and more (lag)  -0.5588*** 0.0024 0.6021*** 
(0.1693) (0.0930) (0.2154) 
Medium firms   -0.3599***  -0.1626**  0.0148  -0.1976* -0.1860  -0.0011  -0.1838*  -0.1661 
(0.1323) (0.0740) (0.0833) (0.1194)  (0.2143) (0.1020)  (0.0943)  (0.2115) 
Largest firms  -0.7284***  -0.3364**  -0.1447 -0.4871**  -0.6342** 0.2541  -0.0440  0.4855 
(0.2033) (0.1371) (0.1367) (0.2175)  (0.3094) (0.1818)  (0.1627)  (0.3853) 
France and Belgium   0.3377**  0.2757**  0.5935***  0.7880***  -0.0231  -0.2637*  -0.0363  -0.3720 
(0.1690) (0.1100) (0.1209) (0.1806)  (0.3130) (0.1510)  (0.1320)  (0.3118) 
Hungary and Austria  (a)   0.4550**  0.3275*  0.7130**  0.2544  -0.3508  -0.2415  -0.8434* 
(0.1809) (0.1988) (0.2800)  (0.9481) (0.2572)  (0.2177)  (0.5020) 
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain  0.4298  -0.0797  0.1336  0.0575  0.5226  -0.2784**  0.2663**  0.2474 
(0.3749) (0.1083) (0.1232) (0.1714)  (0.4867) (0.1262)  (0.1087)  (0.2532) 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  0.5160  0.2724  0.3346  0.5836**  0.0084  -0.5639*  -0.4164  -1.0960* 
(0.3615) (0.1739) (0.2155) (0.2882)  (0.6127) (0.2943)  (0.2901)  (0.6386) 
Netherlands 0.3982*  0.1280  0.2024  0.4468  0.0622  -0.3991*  -0.3498  -0.8199 
(0.2407) (0.1739) (0.1938) (0.2903)  (0.4219) (0.2381)  (0.2653)  (0.5664) 
CZ, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia  0.2954  0.6424***  0.6790***  1.2132***  -0.1361  0.2656  0.0745  0.1627 
(0.2442) (0.1135) (0.1189) (0.1851)  (0.4167) (0.1706)  (0.1302)  (0.3079) 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden  0.4246**  -0.2866***  -0.2934** -0.4739***  0.3034  -0.7803*** -0.5752*** -1.6779*** 
(0.1684) (0.1079) (0.1283) (0.1790)  (0.2441) (0.1329)  (0.1285)  (0.3159) 
UK and Ireland  0.2588  0.1899  0.0098  0.3024  0.5870**  0.1322  0.0645  0.3191 
(0.2242) (0.1343) (0.1627) (0.2198)  (0.2768) (0.1487)  (0.1464)  (0.3285) 
Food, beverages and tobacco  -0.3612  -0.3374**  -0.3420** -0.6981*** -0.9141*  -0.1667  -0.2130  -0.6059 
(0.2830) (0.1341) (0.1613) (0.2197)  (0.4849) (0.1815)  (0.1679)  (0.3734) 
Textiles and leather   (a)   0.1470  -0.2036  0.1476  (b)   0.1618  -0.6241  -1.0922 
(0.2821) (0.4246) (0.4944)  (0.5665) (0.5339) (1.0909) 
Wood and paper  -0.5374***  -0.0634  -0.3119***  -0.2747* -0.3861  -0.0920 -0.3668***  -0.7947*** 
(0.1741) (0.0998) (0.1187) (0.1633)  (0.3000) (0.1424)  (0.1301)  (0.3060)   19
Table 5 (cont’) 
   If firms sold some EUAs indirectly  If firms bought some EUAs indirectly 
Variables  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Coke, cement and refined products  -0.9202***  -0.1701  -0.4540*** -0.5212***  -0.1726  -0.2452 -0.3672**  -0.9351*** 
(0.2236) (0.1257) (0.1318) (0.1938)  (0.3381) (0.1744)  (0.1489)  (0.3526) 
Chemicals and pharmaceutics  -0.2772 0.0107 -0.0764 -0.0117 0.0987  0.1011 -0.4102** -0.5349 
(0.2877) (0.1494) (0.1624) (0.2382)  (0.4544) (0.2002)  (0.1841)  (0.4272) 
Glass, ceramics and plastic  0.0349  0.2011*  -0.1278 0.0742 0.3296 0.0318 -0.1264 -0.1366 
(0.3357) (0.1122) (0.1193) (0.1704)  (0.5701) (0.1626)  (0.1259)  (0.2953) 
Metals   -1.1287*  0.3463  -0.1863  0.2017  -1.0896  0.4688  0.2071  0.5382 
(0.6012) (0.3171) (0.2875) (0.4229)  (0.6891) (0.3768)  (0.3555)  (0.7395) 
Computers and machinery  (a)   -0.4921**  0.2007  -0.5763*  0.4708  0.0780  0.0636  0.0525 
(0.2055) (0.2649) (0.3352)  (0.6952) (0.2423)  (0.2824)  (0.5467) 
Other sectors  -0.6247***  -0.2843***  -0.2186**  -0.5326*** -0.1758  -0.1394  -0.2719**  -0.6541** 
(0.1562) (0.0923) (0.1033) (0.1506)  (0.2456) (0.1180)  (0.1150)  (0.2590) 
Year 2006 dummy  0.5945*** 0.1097 
(0.0890) (0.1380) 
Net allocation (Mundlak term)  0.0000  -0.0002 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Sold twice and more (lag, Mundlak term)  -0.1505 
(0.1973) 
Bought twice and more  (lag, Mundlak term)  -2.0458*** 
(0.4336) 
Constant 1.2932***  0.7967***  0.4007***  0.9497***  0.1631  0.3958***  0.6386***  1.6647*** 
(0.1590) (0.0973) (0.1101) (0.1762)  (0.2458) (0.1237)  (0.1173)  (0.3058) 
Log likelihood  -339.7  -1152.3  -946.1  -1985.9  -150.6  -677.1  -856.5  -1415.3 
Wald test (Chi2)  70.8  291.5  253.4  190.1  22.8  133.9  192.8  88.1 
Wald  test  (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.297 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations (total)  749  2,175  1,603  3,778  234  1,078  1,380  2,458 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(a) Dropped as predicts success perfectly.  




Table 6 The determinants of the extent of trading (Hurdle 2) 
   If firms sold some EUAs  If firms bought some EUAs 
Variables  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Net allocation  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0000 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0002 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
No. of installation within a firm  0.0238**  0.0216**  0.0370***  0.0192***  0.0078  0.0142  0.0186*  0.0052 
(0.0102) (0.0085) (0.0093) (0.0073) (0.0200) (0.0119) (0.0105) (0.0091) 
If sold twice and more (lag)  0.7890***  0.3098***  -0.4947***
(0.0949) (0.0866) (0.0731) 
If bought twice and more (lag)  0.9912*** 0.4762*** -0.6704*** 
(0.2292) (0.1211) (0.1237) 
Medium  firms    1.6913*** 1.6800*** 1.8377*** 1.6086*** 2.1063*** 1.7664*** 1.8840*** 1.6657*** 
(0.1344) (0.0785) (0.0983) (0.0671) (0.3947) (0.1450) (0.1232) (0.1003) 
Largest  firms  3.6781*** 4.0021*** 3.6058*** 3.6019*** 2.8316*** 3.8874*** 3.7584*** 3.5579*** 
(0.2218) (0.1498) (0.1632) (0.1242) (0.5577) (0.2503) (0.2092) (0.1765) 
France and Belgium   0.0362  0.0905  0.3266**  0.2156**  -0.2892  0.2277  -0.3205*  -0.1069 
(0.1728) (0.1183) (0.1441) (0.0998) (0.5728) (0.2216) (0.1745) (0.1467) 
Hungary and Austria  -1.8908*  -0.4965*** -0.8426*** -0.5311*** -1.7688  -0.6932*  -1.0684*** -0.8297*** 
(1.1075) (0.1854) (0.2416) (0.1566) (1.7434) (0.3815) (0.2923) (0.2403) 
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain  -0.5326  -0.0825 0.0450 0.0334 -0.9343 -0.1905 -0.2253 -0.1429 
(0.3414) (0.1200) (0.1519) (0.1003) (0.9026) (0.1872) (0.1427) (0.1201) 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania  -1.4706*** -0.6769*** -0.4469* -0.5089*** 0.0240  -0.7781* -1.0699*** -0.9575*** 
(0.3443) (0.1854) (0.2585) (0.1614) (1.1562) (0.4329) (0.3884) (0.3072) 
Netherlands  -0.8776*** -0.3024 0.0422 -0.1741 -1.4618* -0.1577  0.0304  -0.1291 
(0.2618) (0.1926) (0.2419) (0.1673) (0.7813) (0.3459) (0.3564) (0.2642) 
CZ, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia  -0.4316*  0.3756***  0.2726* 0.3490*** -0.1677 -0.5576**  -0.5317*** -0.3845*** 
(0.2475) (0.1145) (0.1402) (0.0955) (0.7819) (0.2452) (0.1723) (0.1474) 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden  -0.7157*** -1.2715*** -1.6279*** -1.2961*** -0.6224  -1.0209*** -1.6537*** -1.3385*** 
(0.1772) (0.1220) (0.1568) (0.1049) (0.4541) (0.1877) (0.1665) (0.1334) 
UK  and  Ireland  0.3806 0.2514* 0.0593 0.2274* -0.3309 0.1736 -0.0584 -0.0369 
(0.2345) (0.1463) (0.2018) (0.1268) (0.5020) (0.2176) (0.1938) (0.1548) 
Food, beverages and tobacco  -0.5565*  -0.1342  -0.1686 -0.1240 0.9859 -0.3252 -0.2345 -0.1767 
(0.2852) (0.1493) (0.1933) (0.1255) (0.8416) (0.2664) (0.2199) (0.1760) 
Textiles and leather   -1.0333  -0.4194  -1.2068** -0.5313**  -0.8028  -0.1769  -0.3365 
(0.7842) (0.2735) (0.4913) (0.2546) (0.8635)  (0.7158)  (0.5402) 
Wood and paper  -0.3003*  0.1796*  -0.0588 0.0622 0.7892 -0.1569 -0.2566 -0.1635 
(0.1724) (0.1066) (0.1436) (0.0925) (0.5579) (0.2081) (0.1714) (0.1406)   21
Table 6 (cont’) 
   If firms sold some EUAs  If firms bought some EUAs 
Variables  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007  2005 2006 2007  2005-2007 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Coke, cement and refined products  -0.0336  0.0905  0.0474  0.1275  0.5037  -0.0627  0.0409  0.1005 
(0.2501) (0.1380) (0.1596) (0.1125) (0.6323) (0.2547) (0.1972) (0.1647) 
Chemicals and pharmaceutics  0.3326 0.2743* -0.0604 0.2235* 0.7972  0.0778 -0.2691 -0.0737 
(0.2853) (0.1559) (0.1904) (0.1314) (0.8565) (0.2964) (0.2474) (0.2024) 
Glass, ceramics and plastic  -0.9044*** -0.2198*  -0.5026*** -0.2561*** 0.6853  -0.3781 -0.6095*** -0.4334*** 
(0.2795) (0.1129) (0.1414) (0.0938) (1.0221) (0.2381) (0.1636) (0.1397) 
Metals    0.4963 0.2564 0.3159 0.3112 -0.8942 -0.1127 -0.2165 -0.1333 
(0.7029) (0.2816) (0.3331) (0.2228) (1.1778) (0.5241) (0.4465) (0.3509) 
Computers and machinery  -0.5186  -0.1888  -0.2039 -0.1912 -0.1647 -0.4635 -0.1629 -0.2970 
(0.4619) (0.2305) (0.2988) (0.1934) (1.2594) (0.3508) (0.3635) (0.2598) 
Other sectors  -0.3680**  -0.1580  -0.3159***  -0.1657** 0.2274 -0.3418**  -0.5422*** -0.3669*** 
(0.1545) (0.0993) (0.1207) (0.0829) (0.4556) (0.1685) (0.1488) (0.1187) 
Year 2006 dummy  -0.2002*** -0.4974*** 
(0.0485) (0.0756) 
Net allocation (Mundlak term)  0.0001  -0.0003* 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
Sold twice and more (lag, Mundlak term)  1.6679*** 
(0.1102) 
Bought twice and more  (lag, Mundlak term)  2.2489*** 
(0.1983) 
Constant  2.7398*** 2.1888*** 2.2496*** 2.0373*** 1.1867*** 1.6296*** 2.0427*** 1.8499*** 
(0.1580) (0.1041) (0.1320) (0.0942) (0.4565) (0.1765) (0.1503) (0.1267) 
F-test  (Wald test (Chi2) for panel models) 24.630 78.090 58.300  2583  3.060  32.370  46.980  1501 
F-test (p-value) (Wald test (p-value) for panel models)  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  767  2 175  1 603  3,778  234  1 078  1 380  2,458 
R-squared  (within  for  panel  models)  0.410 0.444 0.448 0.031 0.223 0.403 0.423  0.0301 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 